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The problem of Poland’s joining the eurozone is a part of the debate on the 
Polish Constitution. It may be worth discussing this against the background 
of international relations, and relationships between Poland and organisa-
tions like the European Union in particular. The objective and unavoidable 
phenomena of globalisation, stimulated by technological and social develop-
ment are responsible for the fact that the Earth is a shrinking organism bound 
by a network of interdependencies. Regardless of our emotional attitude to 
these phenomena, they cannot be stopped. Negating them is among other 
things a reflection of outdated views on the role and potential of individual 
States. What passes unnoticed is that even the greatest and most powerful 
States are no longer able to cope successfully with all the challenges of this 
rapidly changing world, if they act alone. This is even more true of States with 
an average potential, of which Poland is one, with no chance whatsoever, in 
the contemporary world, of realising dreams of being a fully independent ‘In-
termarium Power’. Thus attempts to do so today are not only an anachronism 
open to ridicule, but they might turn out to be damaging in the long term and 
lead to the marginalisation, or even, isolation of Poland and as such would be, 
despite appearances less than patriotic. It is in Poland’s interest to join larger 
and stronger structures that will not only ensure its security but can also help 
it to eliminate developmental differences. These structures are, first of all, 
NATO which accepted Poland as a member in 1999, and the European Union 
which Poland joined in 2004. Both facts ought to be reflected in the Constitu-
tion.
Unfortunately, the Constitution of the Republic Poland currently in force 
was adopted in 1997, before Poland became a member of these organisations. 
Although during the drafting process possible membership of NATO and the 
EU was taken into account, this eventuality could not be anticipated with 
respect to allowing the creation of relevant legal norms. Hence the lack in 
the Constitution of clear regulation of the relationship between law originat-
ing in domestic provisions and law created by the European Union. A half-
hearted attempt was made in Article 9 which provides that the Republic of 
Poland shall respect the international law binding upon it, or in Article 90 
clause 1 providing that ‘The Republic of Poland may, by virtue of interna-
tional agreements, delegate to an international organisation or international 
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institution the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain 
matters.’ However, a few years later it turned out that these declarations are 
insufficient. An example here may be the European Arrest Warrant the en-
forcement of which was impossible under the provisions of the Constitution. 
Consequently, this collision of norms enforced an amendment to the Constitu-
tion. This case may be treated as a recognition of the supremacy of European 
Union law over domestic Polish law. All this does not happen automatically 
but each individual case requires a separate and clear amendment to the law 
subsequently reflected in the Constitution. Among matters requiring similar 
treatment is the adoption by Poland of the common currency, a commitment 
that Poland made upon joining the European Union.
The adoption of the common currency should now be one of the priorities 
for Poland in the light of the reformation that the European Union has recent-
ly been undergoing. The core of the EU is being shaped around the Member 
States that have the same currency. This tendency will most probably con-
tinue and intensify. The eurozone, having at its disposal the greatest politi-
cal and economic potential, will exercise a growing influence on the shape of 
the future Europe, while States left outside eurozone, and in particular those 
which (openly) deny their intention to join it in the future, put themselves at 
the periphery and deprive themselves of the chance to influence the develop-
ment of events which they are unable to stop.
Thus Poland’s interest requires that it place itself as soon as possible in 
the main decision-making stream, as one of the most important States on our 
continent. This however is currently hindered by a number of obstacles: 
1. One is of a formal and legal nature although it could easily be elimi-
nated by the legislative. It concerns the need to amend Chapter X of the 
Constitution and its Article 227 in particular which provides in clause 1 that 
the exclusive right to issue money is vested in the National Bank of Poland 
which shall also be responsible for the value of Polish currency. Further, 
the same Article regulates the structure of the central bank and determines 
the composition of the competences of the Council for Monetary Policy that 
of course apply to the Polish currency as well. Such a wording of Article 227 
makes it impossible for Poland to adopt the common currency. Additionally, 
other provisions of Chapter X may also turn out in the future to be contrary 
to the decisions of the EU’s authorities. Such a circumstance might occur for 
instance in the case of a jointly appointed minister of finance, or if a common 
budget were to be adopted. Examples of such possible developments have 
recently been observed which is why an amended Constitution seems to be 
a necessary solution for determining the conditions for Poland’s acceptance 
of the common currency.
It could be argued that Poland can access the eurozone without amending 
the Constitution, on the grounds that Article 9 quoted above obliges it to re-
spect international laws, or Article 90 clause 1 allowing delegation of certain 
competences of the Polish organs of State power to an international body but, 
in my opinion, that would be stretching the law to the point of manipulation. 
The easiest solution would be to insert an additional statement at the end of 
Chapter X of the Constitution providing that upon the adoption by Poland of 
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the common currency (euro) the relevant solutions adopted at the EU level 
will also be applicable in Poland. 
2. Another obstacle, making it difficult to amend the Constitution in the 
desired direction is of a political nature. It is mainly connected with the view 
that adoption of the euro would mean a loss of sovereignty. Falling back on 
such patriotic feelings without giving substantial reasons easily discourages 
less politically educated citizens from this project. Therefore the question of 
political education should be given more attention to prevent citizens suc-
cumbing to false arguments. 
It must first be explained what it really means when a State’s sovereign-
ty as a valuable good requiring absolute protection has been lost or limited. 
Such a situation arises when a State becomes deprived of independence by 
the use of force or deceit against its will and legitimate interests. An example 
of this may be the military aggression of the Third Reich on the Polish State 
or enforcement of the Soviet political system after World War II followed by 
subordinating Poland in essential economic and social areas. It is, however, 
a completely different matter when a State acquires access to international 
structures or organisations such as the European Union or NATO based on 
agreements entered into voluntarily. And if the balance of costs and benefits 
resulting from such accession is positive, it cannot be treated as a blamewor-
thy limitation of sovereignty. As an analogy here may serve contracts made 
under civil law which also lead to a voluntary loss of authority over one good 
in return for the acquisition of authority over another. The sale of a car by its 
previous owner deprives him of the right to dispose of the car which has been 
sold, but compensates him with the price of the car which he receives and con-
siders beneficial. While the theft of the same car would stand in contrast to the 
above and could be seen as a limitation of sovereignty. Identifying ‘Brussels 
with Moscow’ is an abuse that is sometimes committed by prominent politi-
cians.
3. The third obstacle relates to economic arguments. This subject is very 
broad and goes far beyond the framework of this paper which focuses predomi-
nantly on legal and political issues. Hence this paper will analyse only the 
objections most frequently raised as constituting reasons why Poland should 
not join the eurozone. It is sometimes claimed that countries outside the eu-
rozone will enjoy faster economic growth and that the effects of the interna-
tional economic crisis will be felt by them less harshly. Such a view can be 
justified by statistical data. However, it must be noted that a selective use of 
statistics poses a certain risk. As an example here may serve the comparison 
of Poland’s economic growth expressed as a percentage of GDP with the aver-
age result of the most developed countries of the euro area. In 2017 Poland’s 
growth will probably approach 4% of GDP, similar to that of a few years ago, 
while in the latter it is likely to reach a little under 2%. If these figures were 
to be used as an argument against the adoption of the single currency, than 
these percentages should be complemented with values expressed in absolute 
figures to make the comparisons a somewhat more realistic. For example, for 
the purposes of simplification let us compare two countries with very different 
economic potential and assume that in one the level of GDP is 5 times higher, 
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for instance 500 units, while in the other it is 100 units (the differences be-
tween Germany and Poland are even greater). A two-percent increase in the 
first country will mean 10 units in absolute terms and a four-percent increase 
in the second country, will mean only 4 units. This example shows the far-
fetched conclusions that the selective use of real statistical data can lead to. 
The need for a more rapid alignment of the levels of development of European 
countries requires more radical undertakings, such as the adoption of a single 
currency. Contenting oneself with favourable percentages, even if they prove 
to be permanent, may prolong unnecessarily the time for Poles to reach the 
standard of living that has been enjoyed by citizens of neighbouring coun-
tries for many years. This requires sound economic analyses not motivated by 
purely political considerations.
Another popular argument against the adoption of the euro is that of, 
which, although in the euro area, is in a particularly difficult economic situ-
ation. However, it should be stressed that this situation has been caused, 
among other things, by irresponsible increases in social spending. In the 
short term, they secured the authorities’ strong public support, but in the 
long run they led to debt that was difficult to repay and to a reduction of 
development and investment outlays. Added to that there were unfair prac-
tices in financial reporting, preventing timely intervention by the relevant 
UE bodies. It is also worth noting that it is only because Greece is a member 
of the Eurozone that it receives massive financial assistance saving it from 
bankruptcy. This aid would probably not have been granted had it had its 
own currency. The threat of price increases is also unjustified. The experi-
ence of countries from our region that have recently adopted the euro (e.g. 
Slovakia and the Baltic States) shows that it is relatively easy to avoid the 
negative phenomena that characterise the initial period of the process of 
joining the euro area.
4. The adoption of the euro may also be discouraged by a number of re-
strictions applied to countries opting for the euro. Among them are what are 
known as the convergence criteria, which must be met by countries applying 
for the right to use the single currency. These criteria include satisfying the 
requirements of a certain level of inflation, public debt, budget deficit, long-
term interest rates or a stable currency exchange rate over the last 2 years. 
This latter criterion means that even an immediate decision to join the euro 
area would entail a relatively long waiting period. All the above-mentioned 
criteria, although they impose tough conditions on states , are in fact healing 
and valuable not only from the point of view of the public finances, but also in 
the long run for the state and its citizens. They are probably inconvenient and 
difficult for the government, but they guarantee a sound monetary and fiscal 
policy. This is their intrinsic value, independent of the fact that they condition 
entry into the euro area, which provides many benefits for its participants. 
These include, for example, security arising from the fact that the euro is the 
second most important currency in the world (after the US dollar). The adop-
tion of the euro also offers many direct and measurable benefits in terms of 
trade, including, among other things, the elimination of currency exchange 
costs and the avoidance of the foreign exchange risk. It would also be hard to 
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overestimate the ease of travel and many other advantages associated with 
using the currency of the most highly developed parts of our continent. 
The economic consequences of adopting the euro are, of course, very ex-
tensive, as mentioned above, and require a number of sound analyses going 
well beyond the comments made above. It would be bad if an apriori negative 
political stance on these issues discouraged such analyses. 
* * *
To sum up, Poland’s accession to the euro area is justified not only for 
political reasons, allowing it to participate in the most important decisions 
concerning the future of Europe and thus guaranteeing the security of our 
state, but also for economic reasons, enabling economic development, aiming 
at raising standard of living of Poles to that of the citizens of the most highly 
developed countries of the world. Such a state of affairs should not be con-
fused with the loss of sovereignty of the state and the preservation of cultural 
values, which have little in common with the currency used. This may be evi-
denced by the situation of countries which have been in the euro zone for over 
a dozen or more years and which have not been affected by the phenomena 
that the Polish people are threatened with. It is therefore worthwhile to strive 
for the adoption of a common European currency and to prepare the Polish 
Constitution for it. 
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There are many reasons why joining the eurozone may be beneficial for Poland. Above all it 
would mean joining the group of states that have a decisive influence on Europe’s future. Poland 
would not only increase real influence on the most important decisions concerning our continent, 
but would also have a greater impact on the guarantees of its own security. Moreover, there are 
economic reasons for adopting the single currency that will facilitate faster economic development 
and accelerate the levelling of differences in the living standards between Poles and citizens of the 
most developed countries of the world. The adoption of the single currency should not be confused 
with the loss or limitation of sovereignty and threats to cultural values. Preparations for acces-
sion to the eurozone require a number of measures, including amendments to the Constitution. 

